The Beginning of Infinity

Then, in all the histories in which you do wake up, you are a winner. If you do not have loved ones to mourn you, or other reasons to prefer that most histories not be affected by your premature death, you have arranged to get something for nothing with what proponents of this argument call ‘subjective certainty’. However, that way of applying probabilities does not follow directly from quantum theory, as the usual one does. It requires an additional assumption, namely that when making decisions one should ignore the histories in which the decision-maker is absent. This is closely related to anthropic arguments. Again, the theory of probability for such cases is not well understood, but my guess is that the assumption is false.

Furthermore, anthropic arguments could not only dispense with all those parallel universes,* they could dispense with the variant laws of physics too. Recall from Chapter 6 that all the mathematical functions that occur in physics belong to a relatively narrow class, the analytic functions. They have a remarkable property: if an analytic function is non-zero at even one point, then over its entire range it can pass through zero only at isolated points. So this must be true of ‘the probability that an astrophysicist exists’ expressed as a function of the constants of physics. We know little about this function, but we do know that it is non-zero for at least one set of values of the constants, namely ours. Hence we also know that it is non-zero for almost any values. It is presumably unimaginably tiny for almost all sets of values – but, nevertheless, non-zero. And hence, almost whatever the constants were, there would be infinitely many astrophysicists in our single universe.

But there is also, he concludes, such a thing as ironic science – the kind of science that cannot ‘resolve questions’ because, essentially, it is just philosophy or art. Ironic science can continue indefinitely, but that is precisely because it never resolves anything; it never discovers objective truth. Its only value is in the eye of the beholder. So the future, according to Horgan, belongs to ironic knowledge. Objective knowledge has already reached its ultimate bounds.